Introduction
Most of the research on migration from and to Central Europe has been inspired by the rich conceptual and theoretical discussion of migration research (see, among others, Castles and Miller 2003; Bommes and Morawska 2005; Bretell and Hollifield 2000; Oswald 2007; Han 2003) . These include the classical focus on push -and/or pull-factors (going back to Lee 1966) , long-term studies on specific mixtures of migration causes (Manning 2005) , and more limited approaches which are centered around various demographic, market and economic factors (Teitelbaum 2008; Chiswick 2008) . Furthermore, research influences stem from attention to social characteristics of migration. Hence, various groups or population segments are affected by migration in different intensities (Kofman et al. 2000) . Also, there is a wide variety of reactions to migration (Fell and Hayes 2007) . More generally, the societal side of migration leads away from the traditional image of one-way migration and replaces the picture by an emergence of transnational spaces and identities, leading to shuttle migration and evolving transnational patterns of movement (Rea and Tripier 2003; Kraler and Parnreiter 2005) .
While all these inspirations have tremendously helped us to understand migration in the Western part of the former Soviet bloc, they have to some extent isolated the issue of migration from other social and political developments. These consist in two major processes -the debonding of Central and South-Eastern Europe from socialism and, almost simultaneously, the region's adhesion to the European Union.
1 Politically, the new regimes depended on those two macro-level trends, limiting political choices of governments and other political actors. The resulting room of maneuver for political action was often seen as severely limited. Therefore, this text follows a somewhat different approach to post-socialist migration issues than is often found in the literature. Our aim is to understand migration policies in the new EU member states mainly in the context of post-socialist transition and European integration.
In approaching the pertinent literature, we quickly find out that we have to consider subfields of research rather than the big picture. In order to assess the dynamics of transition, it is not "post-socialism" or "post-communism" (Sakwa 1999 ) as a whole which is relevant. Instead, the new member states of the 2004 enlargement wave -called "Central Europe" in this text -form the core of a subgroup which has been marked by comparatively successful transition both in economic and political terms (EBRD 1999; Karatnycky 1997) . In a way, Central Europe plus a limited number of countries in the Western Balkans are the ones which actually deserve the label 'new democracy' as almost all cases in Eastern Europe and/or the post-soviet space should rather be seen as complete or competitive authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2002) .
Also in terms of European integration, the countries of Central Europe deserve a special status. Of course, this has to do with their date of EU accession in 2004 and 2007 . Domestic changes as a consequence of EU integration -for which the term "Europeanization" stands, see section 2 -differ from those in established EU member states by scope and depth. Specifically, the accession process has driven the Central European states in a position where they had to adapt to EU legal rules rather than being able to develop genuine policy solutions to given problems. Patterns of reaction resulted in "accession Europeanization" (Axt, Milososki, and Schwarz 2007) : a transfer of EU norms with limited possibilities to influence or change those norms.
For a long time, the concepts of transition and Europeanization have been dealt with separately. The most ambitious approach has been presented by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) . In further works, the discussion opened by these authors has been resumed (Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2006; Bönker and Wielgohs 2008; Börzel and Risse 2009) . With an eye on these contributions, we can now speak of a partly integrated framework of analysis, integrating both Europeanization and transition research. This, however, is only true with regard to the general framework. On specific policy fields, pertinent studies have often remained on the conceptual basis of either one or the other paradigm, or they have completely concentrated on empiric aspects. In contrast, we try to answer questions which combine both paradigms but still refer to the empiric dimension: To what extent do (post-)socialist factors still characterize today's migration and migration policy patterns? How -if at all -can we judge the influence of communist legacies on the contemporary handling of migration flows in new EU member states? Do the impulses from the EU level find a systematic barrier in certain heritages from socialist times?
Transition, Europeanization, and Migration to and from East Central Europe: the background conditions
During socialism, the freedom of movement from, to, and within Central Europe was mostly limited. Soon after the fall of the wall, restrictions became more modest and allowed for trans-border travel. Economic transformation, which in most cases started almost simultaneously with the emergence of the new regimes, exhibited another set of changing frame conditions for the movement of people. If we define transition in a broad sense as a process linking elements of two succeeding regime eras, it becomes clear that the first post-socialist years of Central European migration are marked by features of both the old and the new regime.
This transition phase has once been characterized as an act of "rebuilding the boat at open sea" (Elster 1993) . The metaphor implies that architects and craftsmen of transition are parts of the crew; hence early-phase transformation went back to a large extent to autonomous domestic decisions. This is the big difference to the decade after the year 2000 when EU accession states had to adapt not only to the acquis communautaire but also needed to anticipate the pending reforms connected to EU treaty revision. The application and accession procedure was largely steered by the EU, with little agenda setting power by Central European states (Baun 2000) . This was true even in policy areas where the transition context -and hence a lack of experience and knowledge on the side of the EU bureaucracywas obvious.
In 1998, the EU opened membership negotiations with five of the East Central European countries, putting pressure on neighboring countries this side of the Russian border. The first wave of Eastern enlargement in 2004 then contained eight Central European States: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania followed in 2007.
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With this peculiar combination of accession and pre-accession, the just named ten countries became part of an integrated Europe. Besides the inevitable transfer of sovereignty to the EU level, EU integration led to massive processes of adaptation on the national level. With other words, accession and pre-accession resulted in Europeanization -"domestic political change caused (somehow) by processes of European integration" (Vink 2003: 72) . Although the term is usually attributed to EU member states, effects of Europeanization are surveyed in countries outside the European Union as well, meaning that adaptation in the countries under study has started well before 2004/2007. It has been ascertained that the anticipation of EU membership induced reforms already before accession. A major instrument in the EU's toolbox consisted in conditionality by which the EU offered membership as an incentive to induce change in many policy fields including the movement of people (Axt, Milososki, and Schwarz 2007; Lippert, Umbach, and Wessels 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005) . At first sight, Europeanization seems to result in adaptation processes towards homogenization of afore heterogeneous entities reacting to the same impulses. However, it has been shown that adaptation differs between member states as well as between policies (Radaelli 2003; Börzel 2006) .
In the literature, we can find various concepts of Europeanization. Until today, the one used most often focuses on (mis)fits between the European and the national level, conceptualizing the national level as the dependant variable (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2001; Börzel and Risse 2003) . The extent to which both levels match explains the extent of adaptation on the national level. In further developing the concept authors pointed to the relevance of domestic conditions (e.g. veto positions), accentuating that domestic change is not a quasi-predetermined process. Rather, it should be seen as a process driven by both domestic and transnational/EU impulses. Impulses are viewed as top-down vectors, from the EU into the direction of the national arena. Still, Europeanization is not exclusively a "one-way-street" but has to be thought of as a complex interplay between national, European and global political processes (Beichelt 2009 ).
Conceptualizing Europeanization as an interplay between various political processes already alludes to the specific setting in the countries under study, resulting in the need to consider -alongside the just named two macro-level trends -economic, political and cultural/ historic peculiarities as well. First, it is far from consensual where the borders of Central Eastern Europe are to be determined. In some respects, the region is still accounted for as Eastern Europe because of a common Slavic heritage which begins east of Germany, Austria, and Italy. Also alternative cultural categories play a role, for example the orthodox tradition of some candidate states or feelings of belonging to a non-Western European tradition. These distinctions do not subsume the entire region of Central Eastern Europe but rather introduce dividing lines within the territory between 'the West' on the one hand and 'Russia', as well as 'Turkey', on the other (e.g. Masaryk 1992 Masaryk (1913 ). Therefore, we cannot assume that migration mainly takes place in neighboring regions. Additionally, cultural heritages play a role as long as people have some degree of freedom where to migrate.
A second point concerns long established socio-economic ascriptions. Not even a decade ago, also an unsuspicious scholar like Andrew Janos did not hesitate to insist on the multi-dimensional "backwardness" of East Central Europe; what he meant were lower degrees of economic development, an extensive agrarian societal structure, clientelistic instead of 'Weberian' rational state administrations and an inferior infrastructure (Janos 2000) . Janos has been accused of a lack of neutrality of the 'backwardness' notion. What seems more important today is the fact that the term was used for the region as a whole, as if we were dealing with a homogeneous area. In the years after Janos's book, the mainstream of communist studies has shifted towards the distinctions, not the similarities, of the cases concerned (East and Pontin 1997; Sakwa 1999; Kitschelt et al. 1999 ). In the just cited literature, even the largely Moscow-led communist regimes are discussed according to their dissimilarities. Post-communist developments then lead into an even more heterogeneous landscape. Some post-communist states have seen extensive economic growth, others haven't. Some cases are characterized by elements of societal consensus and a consociational approach; others are the object of societal discontent or -in the 1990s -of ethnic wars. In societal terms, the mere declaration of a region called 'Central Eastern Europe' puts more questions on the table than there are answers (Schlögel 2000; Ash 1999 Ash /2000 .
A third point: As important as these transition processes are, they have to be seen against developments and settings from before the (post-)communist period as well. The most important element consists in the late political nation-building in the region which is connected to the age of the Russian, Austrian-Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. Most nation states in the region were formed after 1918 only, and independence lasted only until the late 1930s. The breakup of Habsburg notably led to a patchwork of nationalities within the newly created states. Internaland sometimes forced -migration within the Soviet Union augmented the size of Russian minorities in the Baltic States. As a result, in most East Central European states we know today of regions where a minority population outnumbers that of the titular nation (see Cumper and Wheatley 1999) . Within the region, different citizenship regimes influence the character of migration across borders. Notably Estonia and Latvia have introduced comparatively restrictive naturalization procedures for ethnic Russians (Poleshchuk 2003) whereas all other countries have by and large granted citizenship to their respective minorities.
While the list just discussed points at considerable differences between the new EU member states, there are also some common context variables. The most basic political development consisted in a series of abrupt border openings between early 1989 and late 1991. We remember pictures of GDR citizens desperately trying to leave their country all throughout 1989. Changes in border regimes of other USSR satellite states were less spectacular but of similar importance. The Round Table in Poland started in February 1989, leading to a non-communist government and a strongly liberalized travel regime later in the year. Hungary demilitarized its border during the summer of 1989. Latecomers in this respect were the Baltic States which could not escape the Soviet -and particularly closed -border regime until after its collapse between August and December 1991.
All these border openings set free a considerable emigration potential (Oswald 2007: 143-147) . Because of the region's historical disadvantage in socioeconomic terms, emigration to Western Europe and the United States had taken place long before Communism. Consequently, there existed a retained emigration potential beyond the hardships of post-communist transition. The resulting family migration since 1989/91 is to be seen as a multi-directional flow. There is migration in at least two directions, and many movements do not reflect final settlement decisions. All this is in line with our general knowledge of late-modern migration -neither emigration nor immigration are necessarily of permanent nature, and processes are rather marked by networks and transnational social spaces than by unidirectional vectors and completely segmented societal groups (Schiffauer 2006) .
When the perspective of European integration started to become real for East Central European countries in the second half of the 1990s, the idea of individual immigration policies became accompanied by a frame of pan-European regimes. The interpretation patterns around these developments are well known. On the one hand, the official praise that characterizes pertinent public relations material by the Commission seems well deserved as long as one examines EU internal developments. East Central Europe has beyond any doubt become closer to Western Europe; the iron curtain has been replaced by bridges, gateways, and other means of transnational interaction. Already before accession actually took place, value orientations and attitudinal openness of the citizens of East Central Europe were at similar levels as those in the long integrated countries of Western Europe (Laitin 2002 ).
On the other hand, the external management of the EU borders is more and more characterized by the mechanisms of securitization (Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998) . In that sense, the growing freedoms of internal movement induce an ever tougher and dispelling border regime which transforms questions of economic and social interaction into matters of (internal and external) security policy. Beyond normative aspects on how to judge a policy which produces a lot of human pain, the effect for East Central European states is ambivalent in another aspect. At the same time that these countries found their independence, their state autonomy and state capacity were heavily circumcised. This development has often been characterized as a process of alienation: "Hence they are forced to close borders and patrol the boundaries of Europe on account of external political pressure rather than in response to their own perceived needs" (Wallace 2002: 622) .
Both association and enlargement processes have strongly touched migration regimes between East, Southeast, East Central and Western Europe. Visa free travel is one important point. Contrary to some earlier expectations, the new member states of East Central Europe were included rapidly into the Schengen structures. Internal border controls on land and sea routes were stopped shortly before Christmas 2007; passport control at airports ceased a few months later. Since then, nine of the twelve new EU member states of 2004/07 -namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Sloveniaare part of the Schengen area which now accounts for about 400 million EU citizens.
3 For the citizens of many third states, traveling to Estonia or Slovenia is therefore linked to a visa to the whole Schengen area. In contrast, Bulgaria and Romania (and Cyprus) will join the visa regime at a later stage. 
Population settings and migration potential: numbers and trends
The background conditions which have just been described lead to peculiar population settings that distinguish Central Europe from many of its Western neighbor states. They will now be discussed.
First, the dissolution of Empires, and later, the breakup of historic artifacts like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia led to a large number of new states in the region. Only Poland and Romania are medium-size EU member states, all others have to be counted as small member states with 10 million inhabitants or less. Citizenship policies are reflected in the fact that in Estonia and Latvia larger parts of the population do not have a regular citizenship of the titular state. However, these non-citizens are usually furnished with permanent residence permits which makes it hard to see them as migrants. In their case, the pertinent policy field consists in citizenship and integration policy and less in migration policy. Table 1 about here Within this limited scope of migration, numbers are however rising. Graph 1 considers real migration flows and therefore views ethnic minorities -for example in the Baltics -as a virtual migration stock. If this caveat is made, the graph indicates that the big economic centers of Central Europe attract the highest degree of migration in the region. Although Poland and Romania are by territory and population the largest countries of the region, they attract very limited numbers of immigrants, often well below 10.000 per year. In contrast, the Czech Republic and Hungary (and in recent years Slovenia) with their capitals Prague and Budapest draw in more relevant numbers. Accordingly, by the end of 2004 about one third of the migrant stock of the Czech Republic resided in the capital (Borkert et al. 2007: 54) .
Graph 1 about here
As we know from other sources (2005: 10), most of these are migrant workers and do not belong to potential other categories like family, student, or asylum migration. This is highly plausible as the Prague, Bratislava and Budapest regions are the only ones in the new EU member countries which are not objects of aid by EU structural funds. 6 Here, we find typical patterns of asymmetric migration relations. Ukrainian migration notably in the economically richer countries of the region -Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia -is a phenomenon similar to the migration of Mexicans into the USA. Like in other countries of the EU, Ukrainian labor migrants can be found in the hotel and restaurant sector, in formal and informal health care, in the construction and cleaning businesses as well as in private home-related employment (Chindea et al. 2008: 20-24) . Certain regions of Central Eastern Europe are in the process of losing their peripheral character and are turning into migration targets. With other words, the periphery is developing socio-economic pull factors for migration.
The growing economic attractiveness of the region, fuelled by an investment climate in anticipation of the European Common Market, is also reflected in growing numbers of migration from year to year. As graph 2 indicates the inflow of migrants to the new EU member states almost tripled in the ten years between 1995 and 2005. Except for Romania -the poorest economy of the region -this tendency holds in every new EU member state. Graph 1 also shows that no consistent influence of EU accession can be observed. Indeed, in almost every country numbers of migrants have been rising but in the Czech Republic, for example, the strongest increase can be observed in 2002, the year before the ratification of the accession treaty. By contrast, in the Slovak Republic the strongest rise occurred in 2005, the year after the accession to the European Union.
Graph 2 about here Migration flows into economically prosperous regions are not very surprising. Still, they deserve a second look in the case of East Central Europe. As a region which is historically marked by agrarianism, internal center/periphery relations are marked by big differences. During the transformation, and despite the beginning of the flow of EU structural funds a few years ago, disparities within East Central Europe have grown (EBRD 2003; Lippert and Umbach 2005) . Accordingly, migration does not only take place by foreigners in the big centers and capitals. There is a corresponding domestic migration and, moreover, a considerable emigration out of some countries. Graph 3 shows that the three Baltic States as well as Bulgaria, Poland and Romania have been confronted with negative migration flows in recent years.
Graph 3 about here Therefore, we have to account for a clear distinction between the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia on the one hand and the Baltic States plus Bulgaria and Romania on the other (in Poland and Slovakia immigration and emigration flows are by and large balanced). Due to a mixture of domestic transition hardships and attenuating hurdles for emigration into Western Europe, the latter have to be characterized as emigration societies. This yields an unexpected relationship -the higher average growth during the years 2000-2005, the lower the migration rate (again, see graph 3).
It must be noted that the migration flows presented in graph 3 present net figures. Regardless of the net balance, every country in East Central Europe is confronted with immigration. Since the next section will take a look at different types of migration and state responses to this immigration, it is useful to analyze the origin of major migrant groups. Table 2 does so in concentrating on non-EU migration which is today the only migration that national immigration policies can relate to (of course, migration within the EU is part of the four freedoms of the common market and can therefore float freely). Table 2 about here The evolving patterns clearly show elements of post-communist heritage in the composition of migration. For example, the most important group of non-EU migrants to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are Russians; this goes beyond the mere presence of Russian minorities in all Baltic States. In the end, it depends on how sympathetic one is to either official Russian or Estonian/ Latvian positions on how to interpret the large number of persons without official citizenship. Russian foreign policy highly criticizes the alleged injury of citizenship rights to an ethnic minority whereas Estonian and Latvian officials insisted on the non-legitimate influx of ethnic Russians during Soviet occupation (Poleshchuk 2003) . A related but not identical point is migration of Russian or other post-Soviet citizens into and out of the Baltic States. Data we have from Lithuania indicate that a good proportion of the migration is family related migration (2005: 10); an element which should be still stronger in Estonia and Latvia, where the Russian minorities are much more important. Table 2 also tells us that Russians in the Baltic States are not the only relevant group that can be explained by historical background. Also the significant weight of Romanians in Hungary hints to a historic pattern as large parts of today's Romania were part of Hungary before the Treaty of Trianon (1920) . The migration from several successor states of Yugoslavia into Slovenia falls under similar terms. Also, the migration of Vietnamese people into the Czech and Slovak Republics has roots in international division of labor organized within the Soviet bloc. Altogether, the presented evidence shows that patterns of migration to the new EU member states are to a considerable extent linked to historic experiences. Context factors influencing the structure of migration flows out of and into the new member states consist of geopolitical constellations before and during the Cold War, of long-term differences between (few) economic centers and (many) peripheral regions, of historically grown regions which were only temporarily divided by impenetrable borders, and by internal cultural divisions leading to ethnic minorities. While these findings do not replace the traditional idea of pushand pull factors being explanatory to migration flows (see, for example, Lee 1966), they underline that the nature of these factors is by far not limited to economic considerations alone.
Patterns of migration policy
The previous sections have shown that the region is marked by considerable heterogeneity both with regard to the nature of migration streams and with regard to long-term historic experiences. We should not expect migration policies to depend completely on contingent context factors, however. The mixture of a transitionary mode of governance and EU influences suggests that other elements need to be taken into consideration.
In general, migration policies have to be judged as comparatively incoherent, lacking clearly defined aims and objectives (cf. Drbohlav 2003: 213; Alscher 2008: 2) . Notwithstanding these judgments, at least three tendencies of rational policy reactions to growing migration pressures can be expected. First, it can be assumed that migration policies in CEE countries eventually mirror the respective economic situation, leading to specific balances of emigration and immigration policies. Second, an increasing interest in managing illegal migration should be visible. Both can be read as a consequence of dealing with socio-economic developments during and after transition, and the aim to become a member state of the European Union. The latter also is likely to have forced East Central European countries to adopt specific measures in the field of border controls, asylum and visa policies. Third, in view of historic legacies specific measures in order to deal with the ethnic patchwork can well be expected. In light of the ethnic heterogeneity of many of the countries concerned (see above) a closer look at migration policies directed to specific ethnic groups might shed light on the reasons behind certain policy measures.
In order to map the field, we need to distinguish between several dimensions of migration and elements of migration policy reflecting the differences. Labor migration -more specifically labor emigration out of Central Europe -probably was the issue which received most attention in the first years of post-communism (for example, see Drbohlav 2003; Kupiszewski and Mattila 2008) . Also, there were important studies on illegal migration, especially with regard to human smuggling (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 2004; Kupiszewski and Mattila 2008) . On the other hand, less problematic types of migration also occurred. Student mobility through the Socrates/Erasmus program has been extended beyond the EU border and today includes countries which are unlikely to become EU members even in the long run. Also, the reintegration of historically grown regions -for example on the two sides of the (new) borders of Poland and Ukraine, of Romania and Hungary, of Poland and Germany -allowed for family reunifications which went along unremarked.
All these different challenges need to be taken into consideration. In policy terms, they are mirrored by different types of reactions which will now be discussed. First, the prospects of citizenship and naturalization will be considered, followed by a paragraph on Visa and Asylum Policies and policies on illegal migration as well as related spheres of activity like border control and readmission. The last section on Labor Migration Policies is included as we expect the policies to reflect the economic situation of the respective state. In general, we aim not at giving a detailed overview of each policy in every single state, but rather to filter out general tendencies.
Citizenship and Naturalization policies -refocusing the nation
The ethnic patchwork of population and the set-free of migration potential after the breakdown of the Soviet Union bring into focus citizenship and naturalization. How these policies are dealt with at least points to two important questions: On the one hand, these policies are crucial in defining rights and obligations (at least in legal terms) for migrants. On the other hand, and of course closely connected to the first, citizenship and naturalization policies can be assumed to reflect the selfconception of a polity (Heisler 2005) .
In recent years most of CEE countries modified legislation on citizenship and residence permits, on the whole reflecting a trend towards establishing stricter measures than used to be the case during the 1990s. For instance, in the Czech Republic a language test for permanent residence applicants has been introduced in 2007 (OECD 2008: 236) . Once having lived in the country for five years under permitted permanent residence status (and ten years holding a visa before) immigrants can apply for naturalization. Quicker access to permanent residence permits is granted to highly skilled workers, who consequently can apply for naturalization more rapidly (Slykalikova 2005: 266, 270) . Foreigners applying for naturalization in Estonia have inter alia to fulfill the requirement of previous permanent residence and to prove their basic knowledge of Estonian language and constitution (European_Migration_Network 2008: 28ff.) .
For being eligible for Lithuanian citizenship applicants are required to have held a permanent residence permit for ten years, to pass a language test and to verify financial means (Brake 2007: 3) . In Poland previous temporal residence of five years as well as sufficient financial means are required in order to be qualified for permanent residence since 2003 (Alscher 2008: 4) . Naturalization policies in the Slovak Republic are turning out to be stricter, by raising the required period of continuous residence from five to eight years and testing knowledge (OECD 2008: 276) . In the case of Romania, it is interesting to note that an exception in the naturalization procedure is granted to entrepreneurs investing to a significant degree in Romania. Usually, the period one has to live in the country before being allowed to apply for citizenship is eight years, in their case the required time span can be shortened (Horvath 2007: 5) . This measure points to the tendency to connect migration policy to the countries' economic development.
Additionally, many CEE countries are encouraging return migration or at least have done so in recent years. The Czech Republic conducted a program to encourage the return of ethnic Czechs by offering incentives like financial assistance for accommodation as well as permanent residence permits between 1995 and 2001 (Slykalikova 2005: 265) . Similarly, Hungary, where ethnic Hungarians returning from the neighborhood account for the largest part of immigrants (European_Migration_Network 2008: 11), introduced legislation facilitating the naturalization of ethnic Hungarians from neighboring countries (OECD 2008: 248) . Return migration is increasing also in Romania, along with the encouragement of return migration being a declared goal of Romanian migration policy (OECD 2008: 274; Horvath 2007: 8) . The law on repatriation adopted in 2002 regulates return migration to Poland and defines the criteria to be fulfilled. Since 2008 the Karta Polaka grants certain advantages like access to the labor market without holding a work permit to ethnic Poles who are returning from successor States of the Soviet Union (Alscher 2008: 2f.) .
Visa, Asylum, and Border Control policies -adaptation to the European framework
With EU enlargement, the management of migration, travel and border crossing was transformed into a policy with transnational connotations. Several simultaneous processes need to be kept in mind when assessing the consequences for the new member states. First, the EU itself was rather slow in integrating the whole policy field (for a comprehensive overview see Müller 2003) . Second, the process did not only concern the EU but -with the Schengen accords being the most important institution -rather Western Europe as a whole. And third, developments took place in interconnected but distinct areas: visa, asylum, and border control.
All of these sub-fields to migration management policy in Central Europe followed a double logic during the first years of European association. On the one hand, getting closer to the EU meant a lowering of internal barriers simply because the freedom of persons belongs to one of the four freedoms of the European Treaties. The resulting growth in social communication across formerly closed borders entailed the functional need for intra-EU cooperation, be it within the frame of the administrative enlargement process or not. On the other hand, growing internal openness required much more harmonization with regard to the external border of the EU and respectively the Schengen zone. As things were, this harmonization led to a strengthening of border regimes in many respects (see Wolff, Wichmann, and Mounier 2009 ).
However, one should not make the mistake to expect either a complete homogenization or even a homogeneous fortification of the EU or Europe. Accession to the European Union implied and implies the adaptation of national law to the acquis communautaire. For obvious reasons, there existed no asylum regime during communist times. In the first years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, an asylum policy was also not really needed as Central Europe mainly served as a transit region for refugees, for example from the Balkans. Therefore, most new member states either had to establish asylum policies from scratch. At the least, there was a need to introduce a further category into asylum legislation, which implies tolerating refugees without accepting them for asylum status (yet) but neither expulsing them to their respective countries of origin. For instance, Estonia introduced temporary protection in 2006 (European_Migration_Network 2008: 4) , Poland established an equivalent category in 2003 (Brake 2007: 6) , the Slovak Republic in 2007 (OECD 2008: 276) . In 1997, Latvia was the last of the Central European states to ratify the Geneva Convention. 7 Coming out of the Soviet period, important differences could be discerned between post-soviet states like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and other Central European states. For example, while the Czech Republic was characterized by open borders (Slykalikova 2005: 265) , Lithuanian immigration policy has been quite restrictive, especially vis-à-vis citizens coming from the former Soviet Union. The intention of this restrictiveness is mainly seen in the aim to foster independence (Brake 2007: 4) . In the Czech Republic asylum policy became more restrictive after the Balkan wars (Slykalikova 2005: 257, 265) . Until the adoption and entry into force (1997 and 1998 respectively) of the First Hungarian Asylum Act, Hungary solely accepted refugees from European countries (European_Migration_Network 2008: 1).
During the association and enlargement processes with the EU, East Central European states undertook significant steps towards becoming part of the inner-EU visa and asylum regime. This basically means that the region has turned from a relatively pure transit region to harbor docks. Therefore, in most countries, the number of asylum seekers has generally been rising during the last two decades 7 Hungary ratified in 1989, followed by Poland and Romania in 1991, Slovenia (1992) , Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic (1993) and finally Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (1997) (See: www.unhcr .at/fileadmin/unhcr_data/pdfs/rechtsinformationen/1_International/1_ Voelkerrechtliche_Dokumente/01_GFK/04_Liste_der_Vertragsstaaten.pdf).
(see graph 4). Beyond this general trend, two further developments can be discerned. One is the vulnerability to major international crises, for example the wars in Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2001) . Figures explode throughout the region during both these conflicts, and again the richer countries are more attractive than, for example, Bulgaria and Romania, which are placed on important migration routes. The second is the continuing relevance of the region for migrants around and after EU enlargement. Here, Poland as a classic border region to the new periphery of Eastern Europe comes into focus; the Bug River takes over the role the Oder River between Poland and Germany played during the 1990s.
Graph 4 about here Furthermore, new member states are requested to implement technologies as the Eurodac system for comparing fingerprints of asylum seekers and illegal migrants employed within the European Union. 8 Estonia, for example, regulated the fingerprint system in 2006 (European_Migration_Network 2008: 9) . Additionally, as they form the fringe area of the European Union, several new member states increasingly become target states of asylum seekers and refugees. According to Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 responsibility for Asylum applications lies in the hands of the member state an asylum seeker enters first. Owing to this provision and the anticipated rise in the number of refugees and asylum seekers Romania has built up new accommodation centers for asylum applicants (Horvath 2007: 6) . The introduction of such new instruments has arguably led to a very restrictive profile in some new member states. For example, Slovakia and the Czech Republic reject almost 100 percent of asylum applications in first instance decisions (see graph 5). On the other hand, countries like Lithuania or Poland are more liberal and allow for a third or more of asylum applicants to (temporarily) stay in these countries.
Graph 5 about here
Further data also allows a preliminary statement on the specific impact of EU membership (as opposed to a general exposure to impulses from Europe). Table 3 sets up a relation between first instance decisions on asylum requests in 2003 (and 2006 in the Bulgarian case) -the last year before EU membership -and 2008. There should be a homogeneity expectation. No big differences between the cases should be expected if EU level developments presumably determine the closedness or openness of a country. Also, degrees of closedness should become more similar during the course of EU membership if the securitization thesis applies. Table 3 about here The data seems to imply that the assumption is wrong. There are important differences between the new member states on how they handle the asylum issue, be there a growing basis for a common asylum policy or not. First, contrary to a homogeneity expectation differences in the recognition rates are bigger in 2008 than in 2003. Whereas in 2003 the percentage of applications recognized in first instance varied between 2.3 percent (Czech Republic) and 55.1 percent (Hungary) , the range in 2008 was from 3.1 percent (Slovenia) to 65.6 percent (Poland). Second, in five of the eight cases 9 asylum policies have been more permissive in 2008 than 2003: in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. This means that only the Hungarian, Latvian and Slovenian asylum policies have become more restrictive. The overall higher degree of openness clearly contradicts the securitization thesis which would assume exactly the contrary, not least because of the softliner countries' position on the long external border of the European Union. Graph 5 suggests that the more permissive policy in 2008 is not just a matter of coincidence but reflects a general trend. Rather, recognition rates in average are rising since the beginning of the millennium, thus shortly after accession negotiations started.
Besides the asylum issue, also visa policies had to be adapted to the European regulatory framework, not least since the entry into the Schengen zone. Here, we can indeed identify tendencies of border fortification. For example, in order to be in-line with the negative Schengen list Bulgaria had to end visa-free agreements with Georgia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine (European_Migration_Network 2008: 9) , countries whose citizens represent the largest part of the Bulgarian migrant stock (see again Table 1 ). Likewise, Poland introduced visa requirements for the citizens of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine and had to finalize agreements on facilitated border crossing (Piorko and Sie Dhian No 2003: 194) .
The visa-free travel between the Slovak Republic and Ukraine came to an end in June 2000, when the Slovak Republic introduced visa requirements in order to comply with the Schengen requirements (ibid.: 195) . Taking a closer look at the relationship between Romania and Moldova, implications of the obligation to introduce visa requirements become even more obvious: In the context of EUaccession Romania established visa for Moldovan citizens, while previously a mobility agreement (coming close to repatriation in the case of Romanian descendents) had been in place (Horvath 2007: 4) . Hence, in 2007 Moldovan applications for Romanian citizenship increased significantly (ibid.: 5).
Against the general tendency of strengthening entry barriers into the EU, only a few facilitations of visa requirements can be observed. One example would be Poland, where seasonal workers from Belarus, Russia and Ukraine can be employed in certain sectors without a visa being required since 2007 (OECD 2008: 270) . These facilitations point to migration policies reacting to the respective economic situation. We will have a closer look on that assumption in the section on Labor Migration.
If we move our focus from policies primarily being concerned with political steering of asylum and visa seekers to more technical aspects of border control, we find almost all new member states primarily engaged with bringing legislation inline with Schengen requirements, strengthening border controls and reinforcing measures to prevent illegal migration (Slykalikova 2005: 257; Brake 2007: 6; Alscher 2008: 6; Horvath 2007: 3) . For instance, during the accession negotiations with Poland, the issue of border control was pivotal and financial means from the PHARE program were allocated to the country in order to strengthen border controls (Alscher 2008: 7) . Thus, overall controls are becoming stricter not only driven by the intention to prevent illegal migration but also to combat cross-border crimes. In fact, aspirations to fight organized crime and terrorism were considered important motivations to include the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice into European policies (Piorko and Sie Dhian No 2003: 187) .
For the purpose of fighting illegal migration, efforts are also being made to enhance cooperation with third countries. Within the neighborhood policy framework, Lithuania and Austria are assisting Ukraine on legislative reforms in the ambit of migration (Brake 2007: 6) . However, the measures introduced not only focus on preventing illegal migration by enhancing border protection but also on dealing with illegal migrants already having entered the country. In 2002, Lithuania augmented the fines for illegal entry, exit and transit, including sanctions for people supporting illegal stay, e.g. by providing work or accommodation (ibid.). Similarly, in Poland besides sanctions, which can be imposed on both employers and employees, foreigners working illegally run the risk of expulsion.
In sum, the impact of the EU on cross-border movement has been normatively ambiguous. On the one hand, migration has been facilitated within Europe, which is strongly compatible with many cross-border linkages that have been hard to sustain during the Cold War. Also, not all migration issues concerning the EU and third countries have been affected into the direction of compulsion and securitization. However, the cost of introducing homogeneous rules has often consisted in tightening border controls, allowing for less migration and increasing a restrictive position of state administrations vis-à-vis mobile persons of non-domestic origin.
Labour migration policy -from emigration to immigration policy
In section 2, we have seen that large differences exist with regard to the economic potential of some countries and some regions within Central Europe. While we can observe agrarian or generally peripheral areas in many parts of the transition region, in some places the economic and social situation is more similar to Western Europe and its centers (again, see EBRD 2008) . This makes some parts of the transition region more attractive for migration than others. Therefore, it seems likely that these differences are reflected in the respective migration policies.
Assessing labor migration policies in East Central European Countries, we first have to take a closer look at the EU level (Lavenex 2009 ). In the EC Treaty, the ability to work in other EU member states was (and is) anchored as one of the four 'freedoms' of goods, persons, capital and services. In practice however, the im-plementation of the personal movement freedom remains perforated even today, mainly because labor market policy remains in the competency of member states. This concerns all member states, including those of the EU-15 (Groenendijk et al. 2008) . With regard to the labor force of East Central European States, there are even more restrictions. Mainly, they refer to low skilled labor and services for up to seven years after enlargement (with other words, they end in April 2011 at the latest with the exception for Bulgaria and Romania).
10 Many states of the EU-15 opted for an early end to the transitional provisions after the Commission offered evidence that they had produced net negative welfare effects on the side of the old member states.
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Whereas the implementation of the personal movement freedom affects inner-EU migration, we now turn to labor migration policies directed towards citizens of third countries. Depending on the level of socio-economic development, the issue mainly concerns countries and regions that attract both high-level and low-level labor migration from abroad -mainly the capital regions of the four Vyšegrad States. The Czech Republic's policy after the breakdown of Soviet Union was characterized by the opening of borders to basically all immigrants seeking to enter the country (Slykalikova 2005: 264) . After a comparatively successful economic transition, the country entered an era of economic imbalances around 1997, leading to a more strict migration policy (Drbohlav 2003) . In 2003, migration policy in general turned into a more active approach, characterized by encouraging legal immigration mainly of skilled labor while striving to contain illegal labor migration. In this context, the pilot project "Active Immigration Policy" was launched in 2003. Initially including citizens from Bulgaria, Croatia and Kazakhstan, it has been extended to Belarus and Moldova as of October 2004. Foreigners included in the program have the right to apply for permanent residence after a shortened period compared to the regular application process. Even though the declared aim of the program is to reduce illegal migration on the one hand and improve the demographic situation on the other (Slykalikova 2005: 265) , the criteria prospective immigrants have to fulfill (qualification and integration potential) suggest that there are also economic considerations coming into play.
Similar patterns can be observed in Poland, where labor migration in agriculture was facilitated for temporal and seasonal workers from Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine in 2006. Already in 2004, accession to the labor market has been facilitated for specified groups like spouses of Poles. Nevertheless, the overall regulations for access to the labor market remain relatively strict until today (Alscher 2008: 3f.) , the protection of Polish workers being the superior aim. Along with this, in a so-called labor-market-test, employers have to prove that they have tried to engage a Polish or EU citizen before having recruited a third state national (Kicinger and Kloc-Nowak 2008: 218f.) .
Likewise, Hungary seems to concentrate primarily on the protection of the national labor market and the promotion of economic development. As in the case of Poland, employers aspiring to recruit foreign workers have to demonstrate their previous intent to engage nationals. Moreover, facilitated work permits can be issued in certain sectors in case of labor shortages (Hars and Sik 2008: 108, 110) . Lithuania as well is developing measures aimed at creating more relaxed immigration requirements for qualified migrants as well as in shortage sectors since 2006. Yet, the main aim seems to be to reduce net migration and for that purpose to promote return migration (OECD 2008: 258) . Within the "National Migration Plan", adopted in 2004, Romania, amidst other concerns, is trying to manage labor migration. Due to the lack of labor force in certain sectors (like construction, clothing industry), companies started to recruit foreign labor, an opening of the labor market can be observed as well (Horvath 2007: 3f.) .
These last examples show that not only the high performing transition countries of Central Europe are starting to react to the specific migration policy challenges of high developed countries. While wage differences still favor the economies of many transition states within the EU, a growing wage gap to non-EU states attracts workers from neighboring or other third countries. As figures in section 2 have shown, labor migration flows follow not only patterns as suggested by geographic proximity but by other historic variables as well. In sum, the whole region is moving into an area of homogenized labor migration rules. Presumably, EU directives 12 instead of national specifications will sooner or later become the major points of reference in order to interpret labor migration into the new EU member states.
An important subfield of labor migration policy consists in handling educational mobility. The directives named in the previous footnote also address the facilitation for students, teachers and researchers to university and research institutions within the EU. Financed by Erasmus scholarships, the EU tries to promote intercultural exchange within this field. East Central European countries were included in the Erasmus lifelong learning program of the European Commission by the end of the 1990s. This reaction scheme clarifies the overall strategy of the new EU member states in the field of labor migration. High skilled labor has become mobile within the EU and is subject to a varying degree of openness. The growing importance of student mobility adds to this picture by forming a basis for the labor market that is growingly oriented at an all-European economic space. In contrast, low skilled labor is by and large dealt with in similar terms as in Western Europe, albeit with different profiles due to a specific post-socialist heritage of imbalanced center-periphery relations. The findings of this text add up to the message that both centennial political process in Central Europe -post-socialist transition and Europeanization -have to be considered in order to understand policy reactions to migration related challenges. Both processes have been conceptualized as separate but interlinked contexts with different explanatory value. Late socialism and the first stages of transition are especially needed in order to make sense of migration flows. In contrast, impacts from the EU level (or an EU-related transnational level, as in the case of the Schengen regime) are of central relevance for the character of reactions -which still do not amount to generally homogeneous profiles of migration policy. However, this does not mean that the transition context alone determines real flows whereas the EU serves as context only with regard to policy reactions. Rather, weights are changing when entering different zones of explanation. The EU is also relevant for the real movement of people, as has been seen in the fields of student and high skill labor migration. Also, transition still helps us understand certain aspects of new EU member migration policy, for example when looking at certain facilitations of the Schengen regime.
Conclusion
The overview of the different types of migration policy has revealed a wide variety of migration measures in the new EU member states. Despite a considerable amount of data and analysis on migration and migration policy in the new EU member states, we do not feel ready to categorize the individual states' migration policies. We think that the available evidence is too scattered in order not to reach highly disputable classifications. Beyond the many differences between cases, however, we want to suggest a few trends which jointly characterize the new member states' migration policies.
First, historic distributions of ethnic settlement significantly impact on migration flows and migration policies. As we have seen, in many cases the largest groups of incoming migrants are today made up of people from the same country as the biggest groups of the respective migrant stock. This type of migration is in many cases facilitated by an access to the labor market, a factor which combines legacies and economic needs. Experiences from Western Europe tell us that these anchor communities have a strong tendency to persist and to possibly strengthen parallel structures within societies.
Second, while many structural elements follow a logic of economic needs there is an overall flexible approach to migration policy. Of course, the EU regulatory framework sets many rules and thus limits variance between cases. Still, (especially labor) migration policies have reacted to the overall economic development with a special eye on domestic labor markets. This finding holds irrespective of different stages of economic transition and policies promoting labor migration and can be observed both in immigration and emigration societies. Thus, the concentration of migrants in prosperous regions as Prague and Budapest and the comparatively higher immigration to wealthy countries show that the success of economic transition significantly influences migration flows and thus impacts onpolicy outcomes.
Third, the fostering of border controls points to an altered understanding of migration policy, which is now primarily seen as "migration management before aliens enter the country" (European_Migration_Network 2008: 10) . Of course, this ten-dency mirrors the Western model and is an aspect of Europeanization even before accession. Right after the breakdown of the Soviet Union Visa and Asylum policies were marked by considerable differences. However, the different initial policies (again reflecting certain historic experiences) merged into a framework which leaves little room for deviating paths. The need to comply with the negative Schengen list required the finalization of Visa free agreements and thereby in the end often overrode historic legacies. However, there is not general tendency towards tougher border control and/or European fortification. In some countries, asylum approvals have become more permissive over time, indicating that the common legal framework leaves some room of maneuver.
Fourth and last, we have to be aware that East Central Europe continues to be a place of economic and political transition. The Europeanization literature has often rejected expectations of coherent and homogeneous policy-making because of the many traditions and settings in the EU-15. The new member states do not only add to this variety by considerable degrees, but they have much less stable environments to offer themselves. Until today, electoral volatility and government instability are by average higher than in Western Europe (Caramani 2006; Mair 2008) . In such an environment, growing coherence of policy making is not the most likely outcome. Emerging differences remain probable despite the high pressure of accession Europeanization. Often, they have less to do with political willingness to oppose European influences. Rather, the late transition environment continues to deliver unexpected side effects in many policy areas. Migration policy is one of them and should thus be analyzed and judged in broad context. 
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